"engaged in interstate or foreign commerce as:
(1) A common carrier by railroad; or (2) An express company or sleeping car or dining car company; or (3) A pipeline company; or (4) A common or contract carrier by air craft or any vehicle in commerce between fixed termini or on a regular schedule or route." Unlike earlier drafts introduced by Senator Wagner at recent sessions of Congress,' the new bill brings within the scope of the compensation plan practically all employees of these different types of interstate carriers. Section 3(a) provides that compensation shall be payable in respect of disability or death of an employee incurred when he "is in the service of an employer subject to this Act and is engaged:
(1) in transportation service; or (2) in duties in or upon any agency or means of transportation; or (3) in the operation, protection, construction, maintenance, repair, moving, or inspection of any agency or means of transportation or of any structure, track, right of way, road, field, equipment, appliance, or appurtenance used or useful in connection with transportation." 7 The bill as a whole is modelled upon the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,' with such refinements as experience has shown to be wise or as differences between the types of employments necessitate. The section likely to be the most controversial from the standpoint of its constitutionality is Section 3(a). By its terms employees are to be included within the protection of the compensation law without reference to whether their activity is in interstate or intrastate commerce or transportation at the time of their injury; the application of the proposed statute will be conditioned upon the type of service performed, rather than upon the interstate character of the employment. Upon the validity of that classification much of the value of the proposal dependsY 6. S. 1320, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. 5695, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) ; S. 4927, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) . An earlier bill, introduced by Representative LaGuardia, had sought to provide workmen's compensation as to certain employments in interstate and foreign air commerce. H. R. 141, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929) . 7, Section 3 (b) specifically excludes from the operation of the act (1) masters or members of a crew of any vessel, (2) employees of any government, (3) persons entitled to compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' or the District of Columbia compensation acts.
8. Act of March 4, 1927 4, , c. 509, 44 STAT. 1424 4, (1927 , 33 U. S. C. S-uPP. VII, § § 901-950 (1933) , as amended by the Act of May 4, 192S, c. 502, 45 STAT. 490 (1928) , 33 U. S. C. Employees (1933) 23 AM. LAB. Lns. REv. 51, 52, where Mr. Donald Richberg, a warm friend of the compensation principle, expresses a possible doubt concerning the desirability of a federal law applicable only to those injured while engaged in interstate transportation.
Supp. VII § 921 (a) (1933). 9. See Richberg, Workmen's Compensation for Railway

I
The history of the Federal Employers' Liability Act is familiar. The first Act' provided that every common carrier operating in interstate commerce should be liable "to any of its employees" for damages resulting from its negligence. This provision the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in The Employers' Liability Cases," on the ground that it embraced employees in intrastate commerce and hence constituted an unwarranted extension of federal regulation. The second Act,' 2 drafted to escape the fate of its predecessor, applied only to railroads in interstate, territorial, or foreign commerce and extended only to such employees of the carrier as suffered injury while they were employed "in such commerce." Thus restricted, it was triumphantly upheld by the Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co.," and so launched upon a career marked by ceaseless litigation, endless and inconclusive "interpretation," and failure to fulfill the desired objective of protecting workmen in an especially hazardous occupation.
The decisions in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act have shown the extreme difficulty of determining whether or not an employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time he was injured. 4 Indeed, the Court itself, through Mr. Justice McKenna, has explicitly recognized and articulated the impossibility of establishing any effective criterion for determining whether a case falls within the terms of the Act. ' This uncertainty results not only in an overcrowding of the dockets of appellate courts' 6 with a type of case that yields no contribution to the progress of the law;' 7 it may also operate to 10. 34 STAT. 232 (1906) . 11. 207 U. S. 463 (1908) . 12. Act of April 22, 1908 , c. 149, 35 STAT. 65 (1908 Term, 1931 (1932 . Note particularly the authors' conclusion that "The deepest significance of these cases is the proof they furnish of the futility of the Act itself. When the process of interpretation and [Vol. 43 deprive an injured workman of any recovery, by reason of his having chosen the wrong forum in which to press his claim." 8 Even if the case is clearly one falling within the Act, the injured employee, or the representatives of one who was killed in the course of his employment, may have no assurance of success. Although the negligence of the employer must be clearly established as in an ordinary tort action,' 9 the Act purports to abolish the defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule. Yet the consequence of Supreme Court decisions 20 has been to resurrect them in the guise of a vibrant application of the assumption of risk doctrine, and thus effectually to remove the supposed safeguards against use of the common-law defenses. 21 The real fruit of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act has been a recognition by the employer of the value of prolonging litigation in a situation in which prompt settlement is typically essential to prevent destitution and suffering among members of a class deprived of their earning capacity and hence peculiarly likely to become public charges. The road to final adjudication, it has recently been observed, 22 has been "made longer and more expensive than it was before the Act, application after twenty-five years still yields unabated litigation and reveals an apparent growing inability upon the part of judges primarily intrusted with its administration to know its meaning, surely the legislation has proven a failure." Id. at 249.
18. See Schneider, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, or Common Law-Which? (1922) with the added probability that should the employee's case reach the Supreme Court he will lose. These facts have furnished the railroads a powerful weapon by which they may force disadvantageous settlements from their employees." 23 To the above criticisms of the functioning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act may be added the further charge that recoveries are inadequate to compensate employees for their losses. While it is undoubtedly true that large verdicts or settlements are frequently obtained in death and serious injury cases, the fact is that, wholly apart from cases in which there is failure of proof of the right to recovery, 2 4 the mass of claimants receive less than the amount that would have been theirs under a compensation award. 2 [Vol. 43 ment dependent on the employer's largesse. 2 " The rules of many railroads provide that institution of suit against the company operates automatically to terminate the plaintiff's employment, and where the injury is relatively slight, fear of loss of employment as well as the cost of the suit prevents the bringing of an action. Since the congressional enactment bars recourse to state compensation laws, 2 7 a large number of these industrial accidents result in direct burdens upon the community at large, rather than upon the industry in which they occurred. II The growing recognition that the Liability Act cannot function effectively in the field of interstate railroad injuries has provoked advocacy of appropriate remedial legislation. The late Chief Justice Taft gave vigorous expression to the need of a federal compensation law. 2 More recently, two thoughtful studies of the problem have appeared, one discussing amendment -within the framework of the existing Act 29 and the other urging the repeal of the Act and the remission of the whole question to the individual states 3 0
The proposal for reform through amendment rather than by a wholly new approach to the problem may be summarily dismissed, for, as has been indicated, the operation of the Act has revealed its deficiencies as a remedial or protective measure. Retention of such a discredited legislative plan is certainly not necessitated by any constitutional re- 29. Albertsworth and Cilella, supra note 18. The authors do not, however, commit themselves to approval of retention of the tort basis of the Act. They mention, but do not necessarily advocate, attempted restriction of the defense of assumed risk in death cases; possible extension of the coverage of the Act; creation of a cause of action for occupational diseases; erection of a conclusive presumption that, where an employee is found deceased on the premises of the employer, the employee exercised due care and the rail employer was negligent; and a rule that assumed risk would not bar recovery, but merely diminish the damage recoverable.
In a second installment of their article, 28 ILL. L. Rav. 774 (1934) , the same authors consider and reject the possibility of returning to the states the power to legislate with reference to injuries suffered by railroad employees. They favor a "limited federal compensation act, restricted to the interstate acts of rail employees." Id. at 788.
30. Schoene and Watson, supra note 14, at 411-422; cf. Richberg, supra note 9. H. R. 12170, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), provided that the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state might apply, within that state, to employments in interstate commerce. The measure was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary which never reported it out. requirement or prohibition. The alternatives are twofold: (1) Complete abdication of congressional control; (2) Formulation of a federal workmen's compensation plan devised, as is the bill under discussion, to avoid the defects of the present system. 3 1 State control is subject to the disadvantage that four states, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina, have no compensation acts at all, that many other states provide ludicrously small benefits, and that numerous existing acts would require amendment or additions before being applicable to the employees now subject to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 32 Further serious obstacles may be suggested. It ,is not at all clear that the states could, without creating what would be held to constitute an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, devise a practicable scheme for providing insurance for the workers on interstate railroads. Railroad workers may be and frequently are employed in more than one state. The deposit of securities or the posting of a bond or the purchase of insurance in each of the states, in an amount adequate to safeguard the maximum number of employees who might there be engaged in work at any given moment, might prove too onerous an expense. No decision of the Supreme Court has dissipated fear of that possibility. In Boston & Maine Railroad Co. v. Armburg,' it is true, it was held that the Massachusetts compensation law was valid, even though it required railroad companies to undertake the difficult task of computing the number of employees within that state who were not within the reach of the Federal Act. But the basis of Mr. Justice Stone's opinion is the same as that recently noted in cases arising under the due process clause, namely, that the party attacking the statute had failed to prove the facts upon which his attack was founded. 34 The decision does not foreclose consideration of the question on a more ample record. Moreover, whether constitutional or not, enforced compliance by interstate railroads with the diverse laws of all the states would prove burdensome in fact and might compel a readjustment of rates to cover the added expense.
31. Albertsworth and Cilella advocate the earlier Wagner plan, limited in its coverage much as is the present Liability Act. This plan would perpetuate the recurrent problem, already noted, of determining whether an employee was engaged in inter-or intrastate transportation when injured. That problem, with its implications of litigation, might well destroy the effectiveness of the compensation principle.
32. See and compare Schoene and Watson, supra note 14, at 411-422. 33. Supra note 27. 34. Id. at 240: ". . . it is not self-evident that the Act is unworkable, and there is nothing on the record which would enable us to say that such allocation is either impossible or so difficult as necessarily to impose any burden on interstate commerce. . . . There are [Vol. 43 Another substantial objection to relegating the accident compensation question to the states is found in the conflict of laws problems inherent in typical railroad employments. The resident of one state may make a contract for his services in a second and may proceed to perform that contract in half a dozen other states. Determination of what law governs when accidents occur in interstate movements may prove as difficult as has solution of the interstate-intrastate question raised by the Liability Act." An, incentive to litigation of that question would remain so long as the compensation benefits of one state statute were greater than those obtainable under another. 36 Difficulties of the kind here indicated, however, might possibly be diminished by some type of congressional formulation of venue provisions, in the event state workmen's compensation acts were made applicable to all transportation employees. Similarly, Congress might consent to the burden on interstate commerce resulting from the application of diverse insurance requirements.
no findings and the petitioner asked no ruling with respect to the point. There is no evidence from which it could be inferred that the allocation could not be made or that insurance could not be effected at a cost bearing a fair relation to the intrastate service to which the Act applies. 36. While it is true that uniformity is not desirable per se in every type of social legislation, it would appear that much is to be said in its favor in the present connection. Elimination of the litigation suggested in the text would alone he strongly persuasive of the merits of a uniform rule. Likewise the consequences of the litigation may create a discontent that will continue long beyond the duration of the controversy. Cf. Hearings, supra note 26, at 1034-1037. Consider, for example, the case of a railroad operating from a division point like Meadville, Pennsylvania.
The runs from that point extend on the one side into New York and on the other into Ohio, while still others remain wholly within Pennsylvania. It may very possibly occur that men employed in the same class of work may be injured in the same manner and to the same degree, and yet, though neighbors in Meadville, receive varying amounts of compensation.
Mention may also be made of the possible amplification and perfection of efforts toward These difficulties may be eliminated by a federal act, assuring workers general, prompt, and precise protection against destroyed or diminished earning power. The advocacy of legislation other than of the type contemplated by the new bill rests at least in part, however, upon the fear that a federal compensation act might be unconstitutional if broad enough in its application to avoid the problems observed in the present Liability Act. That is, some doubt is expressed as to whether a federal statute can be made applicable no only to workers who are employed in interstate commerce, but to the much broader category of workers subject to the hazards of the transportation industry.
37
III
In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the first Federal Employers' Liability Act, accident prevention under a federal system. Accident prevention is generally recognized as one of the most valuable products of workmen's compensation laws, although some state commissions are less acute than others in grasping the opportunities. The laggard and backward states would not be in a position to affect a federal program. But cf. [Vol. 43 the trend of legislation has been definitely toward centralization of functions in the federal government. The decisions of the Supreme Court have kept pace with this legislative recognition of governmental exigencies. With the exception of its refusal to sanction congressional control of the shipment of goods made in factories employing children, the Court has been constant in its approval of statutes passed in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce among the states.
A concomitant of the development of federal control has been an awakened recognition of the fact that characteristically intrastate matters may fall within the ambit of congressional power. No new principle was involved, for it has long been agreed that Congress is authorized to enact whatever legislation is appropriate to protect or promote interstate commerce and the instrumentalities by which it is carried on." There has seemed to be, however, a more acute realization of the nexus between state and federal concerns. Wherever the relationship of matters of intrastate commerce and interstate commerce has been thought to be so close as to affect the latter, federal control of the former has been sanctioned. The rate cases are familiar examples 30 Similarly, the Supreme Court has approved of federal orders regarding abandonment or maintenance of railroad branch lines lying wholly within one state; 40 a federal statute regulating a local board of trade dealing in grain futures; 4 ' a federal penalty for disposing of stolen automobiles; 4 " and the restraining of intrastate activities which affect the flow of interstate commerce.
43
In the realm of transportation employment, Congress has been held competent to establish safety-appliance regulations applicable both to interstate and intrastate traffic; 44 to prescribe rules of liability to workers injured by reason of defective or prohibited equipment on either inter- The question in each case is one of. fact. Is the regulation of intrastate commerce required to further and perfect the regulation of interstate commerce? 48 The Safety Appliances Act was upheld as to intrastate cars because the activities of the transportation business made it clear that the security of interstate commerce could not be advanced unless all rolling stock carried uniform approved equipment. The Hours of Labor Act was approved because excessive hours in intrastate activity would destroy the beneficent and protective purpose of restricting the hours of occupation in interstate commerce. Similarly, when wage-regulation was shown to be required in an emergency, the interrelationship of all types of railroad employment was so clear as to preclude the possibility of assuring continuity of service by only a partial regulation. Olsen, supra note 41. And it may be noted here that the burden of proof would seem to be on the party seeking to show that the answer should be negative. See Stafford v. Wallace, supra note 41, at 521: ". . . it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent." Cf. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931) .
49. 223 U. S. 1, 48 (1912) . 50. 233 U. S. 473, 477 (1914) . And see the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Carey v. New York Central Rr. Co., 250 N. Y. 345, 355, 165 N. E. 805, 808 (1929) . [Vol. 43 Federal Employers' Liability Act is unnecessarily restricted in its application only to those employees whose service at the time of injury was in interstate commerce. A railway, he observed, is a highway for both types of commerce, interdependent as to safety and movement, and there is great practical difficulty in separating the general work of train crews into one compartment or the other; hence, Congress might have chosen to have regard for the general character of the employee's work, rather than for the precise nature of his occupation at the moment of misfortune. This suggestion is but further recognition of the rule that Congress may in its discretion legislate to whatever extent is necessary to make effective its control over interstate commerce.
The decisions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act themselves demonstrate the link that binds to interstate commerce the employees of the categories enumerated in the proposed bill. Their work is interchangeably in the two classes of commerce; their functions, whether wholly within one state" or in several, are precedent conditions to the flow of goods and passengers. They are of a class especially trained for the tasks performed; the workers in the repair shop, the watchmen, the yard clerks, and all the other groups constitute a pool of labor from which are drawn the momentary needs of interstate commerce. Whatever affects the personnel or efficiency of that pool" is within the power 51. The Wagner Bill does not purport to embrace within its terms employees of a company who are engaged in some local activity not intimately related to the movement of commerce. Cf. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439 (1915) , where a miner employed in a coal mine owned by the railroad, suing to recover for injuries received in an explosion in the mine, was held not to be engaged in interstate commerce, although the coal might be used in the conduct of interstate commerce after it was mined. Nor does the bill cover resident office or building employees, whose accident hazards are not of a kind special to the transport htion industry and who may readily be made compensable under state laws for such injuries as they may suffer in the course of their employment. The accident reports show that members of this class, though numerous, suffer casualties with relative infrequency. Accident Bull. No. 101 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics, 1933) 16. A section of the new bill provides that "Nothing in this act shall be construed as restricting in any way the application to employers subject to this act of the laws of any state providing rules of liability or compensation for disability or death suffered by employees not covered by the provisions of this act." The section should foreclose any contention that Congress, by legislating as to some employees and not others, intended "to occupy the whole field." Cf. Oregon-Washington Rr. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926) ; and see the Act of April 13, 1926 , 44 STAT. 250 (1926 , 7 U. S. C. Sum'. VII § 161 (1933) , which was passed to overcome the effect of that decision.
52. It may be estimated that in the past winter, a period of less than customary employment, over one million persons were employed by the railroads, Pullman Company, dining car companies, and express companies in some aspect of rail transportation service or in the maintenance of way, structures, equipment, and stores. See WAGE STATISTics OF CLASS I STAm RAILwAYs IN THE UNITED STATES, DEC. 1933 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics, of Congress to govern. Even those employees of the named categories who might never be engaged, as the Court has defined the term, in interstate commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be a part of it, are appropriate objects of federal concern, for upon their continued service rests much of the burden of keeping open the highways of travel and of maintaining and protecting the equipment to be used on those highways."
In truth, the coverage of the Wagner Bill is but an adaptation of the suggestion contained in Illinois Central Rail- 53. See cases cited in notes 44, 45, and 46, supra. Extended citation of cases showing the nexus between intrastate employments and the needs of interstate commerce is deemed unnecessary. Reference may be made to the discussion in Schoene and Watson, supra note 14. One of many examples is Erie Rr. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303 (1916) , where an employee was injured en route to the yardmaster's office; if he had arrived safely, he would have been given orders to make up an interstate train. Similarly, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Rr. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353 (1917) , an engine repairman was incapacitated from serving the needs of interstate locomotives. In Chicago & Eastern Illinois Rr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra note 23, the injured employee's work affected the supplying to interstate locomotives of the fuel without which they could not move.
road Co. v. Behrens; 54 it goes further only in that it establishes a general definition, operative regardless of the particular facts of the individual case. In view of the administrative difficulties and the cost of determining in each instance whether a man's past or future services might play a part in interstate commerce, and of the desirability of a speedy, almost automatic settlement of claims for injuries, 5 it would seem clear that occasional anomalies should not invalidate the proposed scheme. What may be characterized as the "rule of administrative necessity" is well established by the Supreme Court's decisions. 6 It may be conceded that the view here urged would necessitate at least a substantial departure from the First Employers' Liability Cases, though clearly the Wagner proposal is not so broad as the Act there condemned. But it must be recalled that the approach of the Court in the earlier case was not a factual one, nor was such an approach urged upon it. The difficulties illustrated by the operation of the present Act were not then appreciated. A change of result, it is now recognized, is required by expanded knowledge of the facts upon which a statute must operate. 7 
IV
What has been said as to railroads and their satellite agencies would seem equally applicable to the other types of transportation activity included in the Wagner Bill. The carriers enumerated in Section 2(3) are, save for the water carriers which may better be dealt with in a statute limited to maritime concerns, the chief commercial competitors of the railroads. The whole trend of government regulation is toward co-54. Supra note 50. 55. Representatives of the carriers, appearing before the Sutherland Commission long before the abundant flowering of perplexities under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, recognized the necessity and desirability of extending the proposed compensation act to others than "interstate" employees. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 26, at 1043 , 1038 -1039 , 1020 -1021 . 56. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888 Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912) Modified and Overruled Decisions (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 361, 593, 795. ordination of the transportation facilities of the country, 5 and the present proposal is conformable with that tendency.
The interstate movement of goods and passengers by truck and bus is increasingly important, 9 and presents numerous problems resembling or affecting those noted in rail transport. The proposed bill, contemplating the administrative difficulties involved, as well as the hardship imposed on those who, because of sporadic and unexpected engagements in interstate commerce, might be compelled to insure under both state and federal acts, is limited to common or contract 0 carriers operating between fixed termini or on a regular schedule or route. 6 Motor transport of this type is marked by peculiar hazards, arising, for example, from efforts to maintain schedules en route on crowded highways, from bad employment conditions and overly long hours of service, from use of vehicles not adapted to the purpose for which they are used, and from the frequent transportation of explosives and inflammable liquids. 2 The largely interstate character of many of the operations vitiates effective state regulation. 63 Financial irresponsibility'is especially marked among 60. There would seem to be no constitutional difficulty, other than that discussed in this paper, involved in this type of regulation of contract carriers. Cf. Brown and Scott, Regulation of thre Ccmtract Motor Carrier under the Constitution (1931) 44 HAuv. L. Rxv. 530, 566; Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Motor Carrier Regulation: Federal, State and Municipal (1926) "An employer corporation domiciled in New Jersey operates a fleet of trucks in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York engaged in gathering milk and bringing it to a receiving station in Brooklyn. The employer recognizing his responsibility for compensation coverage instructed his broker to secure a policy. It developed however, that the New Jersey [Vol. 43 the interstate operators, who are less subject to state supervision; 6 " typically, both truck and bus companies are small units. 6 5 Yet these operations have a serious effect not only upon the operating and financial problems of railroads, 6 6 but also upon wages and conditions of employment for rail workers." The Interstate Commerce Commission suggests the desirability of uniform regulation by Congress to assure safety and convenience in the motor transport field."
Aircraft transportation is not at present of prime importance in the national economy, though itmay be expected to be of increasing sigcarriers declined the risk because of uncertainty of the extra territorial liability. Thereupon the broker applied to the New York State Insurance Fund. The management however, expressed the opinion that there was probably no liability existing for New York State coverage and therefore declined to issue a policy unless this Department or the Department of Law would supply an opinion that New York State liability was indicated.
"The practical difficulty about this procedure is the fact that neither the Industrial Commissioner nor the Department of Law can properly undertake to give a coverage opinion as to the coverage obligation of a private employer for two reasons. First, because such opinion would not be binding upon the Industrial Board or the courts in any actual case later presented and further because a slight variation in the facts would render such opinion inapplicable. Hence all that this Department can tell the broker in this dilemma is that we would not attempt to enforce coverage under the mandatory provision of our Act because in any criminal prosecution for failure to provide coverage we would not be in a position to prove to the satisfaction of the court that coverage responsibility clearly exists.
"Despite the fact that the higher courts of this state have passed upon a number of cases involving coverage obligation of employers engaged in interstate commerce, the truth is that there still exists great uncertainty as to what the ruling would be in any given set of facts such as set forth by this broker... "As the broker points out, even if the employer secures Jersey coverage it may well be that an employee who happens to be injured in New York State may file a claim under our Act because of the more liberal benefits prevailing under our statute. The insurance carrier would, of course, resist the claim because he has received a premium based upon the New Jersey Act and experience and it might well be that if the courts sustained the claim the employer might be held liable and his New Jersey carrier released. In this event the employer would be a non insurer and therefore subject to a penalty for a misdemeanor as well as burdened with the liability for payment of the award. To be entirely on the safe side it would seem that such an employer would be forced to take coverage in all three states. This involves an extraordinary and unwarranted expense to say nothing of the complications involved in establishing a separate payroll as a basis of premium for each of the several carriers. ...
"It seems to me that this case illustrates the desirability of a Federal statute bringing all interstate commerce carriers within its scope not only to avoid the delay in adjudication in actual accident or death cases presented, but to eliminate the uncertainty as to coverage responsibility on the part of employers engaged in this enterprise." 64. Report of I. C. C., supra note 58, at 280. nificance. 69 The present protection afforded by the States to aviation workers is said to be unsatisfactory, though burdensome upon the industry. 7 " Pipe lines carry an important share of all inland traffic 7 ' and those who are employed in the industry, though it may be assumed that their actual work is consistently localized, must regularly be occupied interchangeably in interstate and intrastate commerce. 72 Adequate safeguards for employees in these several interstate transportation activities are difficult of achievement in the absence of federal action. Analogous experience need not be ignored by the legislature in developing a statutory program. The strategic value of a single program, covering all competing interests, is obvious; it should not be sacrificed in favor of piecemeal treatment of the problem.
CONCLUSION
The present state of legislation is unsatisfactory. Amendment of the existing scheme, while curative of some glaring defects, would not serve to further the modern social policy regarding compensation for industrial injuries. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, however much refurbished, would continue to condition redress upon the employer's fault, rather than upon the fact of loss to the worker and the community. Application to interstate transportation of local workmen's compensation acts, on the other hand, seems presently undesirable because of disparity among the various state laws and because of the probable high cost of securing insurance coverage.
An immediately effective system is at hand, however, in the scheme for an inclusive federal act. Rigid distinctions between interstate and The same difficulty, it may be expected, would attach to determining whether at any given time (such as the time of injury) one who was occupied in maintaining or operating pipeline facilities was or was not employed in interstate commerce.
[Vol. 43 intrastate commerce must give way before compelling practical considerations. The distressing results of the present law are apparent. A court will hesitate long before it denounces as unwarranted a legislative conclusion that a workmen's compensation law like that to be proposed by Senator Wagner has no relation to the safety of goods and persons carried in interstate transportation or to the safety of the employees 73 who are indispensable, as a body, to that transportation. 
